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• The apparent overvaluation of house prices
in several advanced economies is an ongoing
concern for policy-makers, since a significant
downturn in prices would have adverse
effects for consumer spending and the
aggregate economy.
• House prices inﬂuence consumer spending
through two main channels: a direct housing
wealth effect and a collateral effect.
• The evidence cited in this article suggests
that the link between house prices and
consumer spending is stronger in countries
with more-developed mortgage markets
characterized by lower down payment
ratios, increased availability of home-equity
borrowing products, longer average mort-
gage terms, and a higher degree of mortgage
securitization.
• The liberalization of mortgage markets since
the early 1980s has resulted in a stronger
link between house prices and consumer
spending.
he most recent increase in real house prices
around the globe, which for some countries
now appears to be over, has signiﬁcantly out-
paced previous episodes. Although some
studies (e.g., IMF 2008c) suggest that the rapid rise in
house prices was not in line with economic funda-
mentals, the extent of this overvaluation is highly
uncertain. Moreover, the impact on global economic
growth of a broadly based correction in house prices is
not clear. Although some advanced economies have
already begun to experience declines in real house
prices, consumption expenditures and other measures
of demand have not yet fallen appreciably. Neverthe-
less, the likely adverse effects on consumer spending
and the aggregate economy of a signiﬁcant downturn
in house prices are an ongoing concern for policy-
makers.
Movements in house prices can affect consumer
spending in two ways: through a direct wealth effect
implied by the life-cycle and permanent-income theo-
ries, or through a collateral effect, by allowing greater
access to credit. Under the permanent-income theory,
households perceive their houses as wealth, and base
their spending decisions in part on movements in net
wealth positions. As well, if access to credit for some
consumers is contingent on their housing wealth or
equity, these credit-constrained households will be
able to borrow and spend more, based on an increase
in the collateral value of their homes.
The purpose of this article is to examine estimates of
the effect of housing wealth on consumer spending in
a group of advanced countries, and how institutional
differences in national mortgage markets lead to dif-
ferent effects on consumption. The article is organized
as follows. The next section contains a brief review of
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recent developments in house prices in advanced
economies and a discussion of whether, at current
prices, houses are overvalued. Next, we summarize
the key reasons why house prices might enter into
household consumption decisions and explain the
role of institutional differences in mortgage markets in
the link between house prices and consumer spending.
We then discuss how the effect of housing wealth on
consumer spending may have changed as mortgage
markets in advanced economies have undergone sig-
niﬁcant deregulation. We conclude with our views on
the potential impact on consumer spending of a global
slowdown in house price appreciation.
Housing Prices in Advanced
Economies
The recent boom in house prices across advanced
economies is unprecedented in its size and duration
and appears to have been more synchronized across
advanced countries than in the past. In a study of
16 countries belonging to the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
Girouard et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, since 2000, 13 coun-
tries experienced a real increase in house prices that
exceeded 25 per cent. Substantial increases in existing
house prices occurred in Ireland, the United Kingdom,
Spain, France, Australia, the United States, and Can-
ada (Chart 1).1 In contrast, some countries, such as
Germany and, more importantly, Japan, have experi-
enced declines in real house prices over the past
10 years. In Germany, the weakness of the housing
sector followed the uniﬁcation boom and is also
related to the withdrawal of tax subsidies in the late
1990s; while in Japan, house prices have been stagnant
since the collapse of the housing bubble in the early
1990s. Notably, the countries recently experiencing
strong appreciation in house prices have also experi-
enced robust growth in consumer spending, raising
the possibility that higher home equity is a key chan-
nel stimulating consumer spending (Chart 2).2
More recently, the global pace of appreciation in existing
house prices has slowed, or reversed (Charts 3 and 4).
1.  Unlike earlier episodes, where housing booms have been limited to a few
regions, for many countries, including the United States, the most recent
boom was nationwide (Shiller 2007).
2.  The comovement between house prices and consumer spending may also
reﬂect the inﬂuence of common factors, such as an improvement in income
expectations that will increase demand for consumer spending and housing.
This article considers the literature that examines a causal link between con-
sumer spending and house prices and does not examine common factors
driving both house prices and consumer spending.
In the United States, the slowdown began in mid-
2005, and real house prices have fallen since mid-
2007.3 Signs are also emerging of a cooling in European
housing markets, with growth in prices moderating
in most countries. In Ireland and, more recently, the
3.  Real house prices in the United States are measured using the Ofﬁce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) index deﬂated using total
consumer price inﬂation.
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most overvalued in Ireland and the United Kingdom,
where they are estimated to be about 30 per cent
higher than can be justified by fundamentals (Chart 5).6
The second group of countries where roughly 20 per
cent of house prices cannot be explained by funda-
mentals includes France, Australia, and Spain. The
6. The IMF study does not include supply factors. The overvaluation in coun-
tries with land scarcity (e.g., the United Kingdom) may therefore be overesti-
mated.
Chart 3
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United Kingdom and Spain, prices have begun to fall;
the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2008a) expects
further declines in house prices in these countries over
2008–2009. In Canada, the growth in house prices is
expected to moderate, since affordability has deterio-
rated and economic growth is expected to slow. With
few signs of excess supply at the national level, the
growth in prices is expected to remain positive (Bank
of Canada 2008).
Assessing Global Overvaluation in
House Prices
Whether, and to what extent, house prices are likely to
experience a pronounced correction is hard to deter-
mine. To address this issue, it is necessary to examine
prices in light of their underlying fundamentals (or
determinants). Typically, these can be decomposed
into demand factors (affordability, real disposable
income growth, real interest rates, household forma-
tion rates) and supply factors (housing stock, land
scarcity, and the availability of skilled labour). Coun-
tries that have experienced the greatest run-up in
house prices, and for which a large share of the
increase cannot be explained by fundamentals, are
likely to be the most at risk of experiencing a severe
correction.
In many advanced countries, a large
proportion of the house price
increases over 1997 to 2007 does
not seem to be accounted for
by changes in fundamentals.
A recent IMF study (2008c) finds that, in many
advanced countries, a large proportion of the house
price increases over 1997 to 2007 does not seem to be
accounted for by changes in fundamentals, such as
affordability, growth in real disposable income, and
real interest rates.4, 5 Housing prices appear to be
4.  See the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, April 2008, Box 3.1 “Assessing Vul-
nerabilities to Housing Market Corrections.” Growth in house prices is mod-
elled as a function of an affordability ratio, growth in disposable income per
capita, short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates, credit growth, and
changes in equity prices and working-age population.
5.  Several criticisms can be made of this study; e.g., credit growth is not part
of fundamentals, it is a facilitator at best, and it can be an ampliﬁer of house
prices.34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
Housing wealth may have a larger
effect on consumption than changes
in ﬁnancial wealth, since it is spread
more evenly across the population.
Unexpected wealth shocks change the permanent
income of households and thereby affect the life-cycle
pattern of saving and consumption which, in its most
basic form, implies that the marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) out of wealth should be the same
across different categories of wealth, including financial,
housing, and human wealth.11 A companion literature
has argued, however, that shocks to different forms of
wealth can elicit varying consumption responses.
For example, the effect of housing wealth on con-
sumption may be larger than the effect from other
forms of wealth. First, households may view some
forms of wealth as more uncertain (Lettau and Lud-
vigson 2004; Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2005), and
since house prices are typically less volatile than stock
11.  The MPC is the ratio of a change in consumer expenditure to a change in




Note: Gaps are the percentage of increases in house prices that
cannot be explained by fundamentals.






















overvaluation appears to be more limited in the United
States (about 10 per cent), where a decline in house
prices has already begun.7 In Germany and Canada,
recent price levels appear to be roughly in line with
fundamentals. Consistent with the IMF’s ﬁndings, the
OECD (2008) ﬁnds that prices in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain are overvalued
relative to fundamentals.
Considerable uncertainty surrounds these estimates,
however, since house prices can be affected by speciﬁc
features of national housing markets that are not cap-
tured by the IMF’s model. In the United Kingdom and
Ireland, for example, homebuilders’ ability to respond
to higher house prices is constrained by complex zon-
ing rules and slow administrative procedures.8 Fiscal
incentives in some countries, such as the Netherlands,
have also played a role by creating favourable condi-
tions for those choosing to invest in housing. Never-
theless, given the risk that housing may be overvalued
in many advanced economies, it is important to evalu-
ate the effect of house prices on consumer spending.
The Effect of Housing Wealth on
Consumer Spending
A well-developed literature based on the permanent-
income hypothesis or the life-cycle model has estab-
lished a link between consumption and wealth
(Friedman 1957; Ando and Modigliani 1963). Accord-
ing to the permanent-income hypothesis, a house-
hold’s consumption in any given period is equal to its
permanent income, deﬁned as the annuity value of
household wealth.9 The current value of household
wealth is the sum of human wealth and non-human
wealth. Non-human wealth includes both ﬁnancial
and housing wealth, with housing wealth often form-
ing the largest component of household assets.10
7. Real house prices as measured by the OFHEO index have already declined
by 4 per cent since 2006Q4. Other measures, such as the Case-Shiller index,
suggest that much larger declines have taken place.
8.  The United Kingdom has also experienced a less-pronounced increase in
residential investment, which may indicate that recent price appreciation has
been driven by supply shortages.
9.  Assuming that older generations do not plan to leave money behind to
younger generations (i.e., a bequest motive).
10.  In Canada and the United States, housing wealth accounts for approxi-
mately 20 and 30 per cent, respectively, of total gross household assets, while
in most major European countries it accounts for between 30 and 40 per cent
of household assets. In Japan, housing wealth represents only about 10 per
cent of household assets.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
prices, households may view gains in housing wealth
as more permanent. Second, these differences in cross-
asset wealth effects may be related to distributional
effects. Empirical evidence suggests that the MPC
out of wealth is lower for higher-income households
(Souleles 1999), suggesting that housing wealth may
have a larger effect on consumption than changes in
ﬁnancial wealth, since it is spread more evenly across
the population.
There are also reasons why the effect of housing
wealth on consumption may be smaller than that from
other forms of wealth. First, for homeowners, an
increase in the value of their housing wealth will be
matched by an increase in their implicit rental cost
and should not raise the volume of their spending.12
Second, for households saving to buy a house, higher
house prices could reduce consumption, since these
households must increase their savings to ﬁnance the
more expensive purchase. Third, unlike increases in
ﬁnancial wealth, increases in housing wealth may
reflect supply constraints rather than an increase
in the productive potential of an economy or an
improvementineconomicconditions.Finally,housing
wealth may be less liquid than other types of wealth
because of high transactions costs (e.g., reﬁnancing
fees) when borrowing against home equity to ﬁnance
consumption.
The effect of house prices on consumer spending may
also reﬂect the important role played by housing
wealth as collateral for borrowing. In many countries,
it is common for households to ﬁnance their spending
through debt, which is often obtained through secured
consumer loans that require the borrower to put up
collateral.13Theprimaryformofcollateralavailableto
most households is their housing equity, so that the
borrowing capacity of some households may be tied
to the value of their homes.14 An increase in the value
of their homes thus increases the amount of collateral
available, which can increase the quantity and improve
the price of credit available to these households
(Mishkin 2007). Rising house prices may therefore
encourage consumers to borrow more, causing an
increase in consumer spending.
12.  Since consumer spending includes imputed rent, higher housing wealth
automatically increases consumer spending. However, this would be
reﬂected in the deﬂator, rather than in the volume of consumer expenditures.
13.  Secured loans are often preferred to unsecured loans, since collateral
reduces the agency costs associated with borrowing and reduces the price of
credit for borrowers.
14. The fact that most secured borrowing is based on housing equity helps to
explain why housing wealth has a bigger effect on spending than other types
of wealth in some countries.
Overall, several factors suggest not only that the effect
of housing wealth on consumption is likely to differ
from that of other forms of wealth but, like other
wealth effects, it is uncertain. Moreover, even if house-
holds view an increase in house prices as an increase
in their wealth, they may not adjust current spending
because of ﬁnancial constraints. In particular, consum-
ers may be precluded from consuming their housing
wealth if they cannot draw on other liquid assets or
borrow to finance their consumption of housing
wealth.
Empirically, estimates of the effect of housing wealth
on consumption vary across countries (see Table 1).
The housing wealth effect is estimated to be the
strongest in Japan, the Netherlands, the United States,
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Spain
and France, however, have relatively low MPCs out of
housing wealth. This may be related to the less-devel-
oped mortgage markets in the latter countries, which
constrain the ability of consumers to borrow against
their housing wealth.
Some studies also examine whether consumers’
responses to changes in housing wealth are asymmetric.
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005), using a panel of U.S.
states, ﬁnd that increases in housing wealth have posi-
tive and signiﬁcant effects on consumption, but that
declines in housing wealth have no effect. In contrast,
Skinner (1996) and Engelhardt (1996) ﬁnd that
declines in housing wealth have a larger effect on con-
sumption (2.5 times stronger, by Skinner estimates)
than increases in housing wealth. Although most of
these studies use U.S. data, there is also some interna-
tional evidence. For example, Disney, Gathergood,
and Henley (2007), using U.K. data, ﬁnd no evidence
Table 1
Estimated MPCs out of Housing Wealth across
Advanced Economies
Marginal propensity to consume (MPC) (%)
Australia 7 (Catte et al. 2004)
Canada 5.7 (Pichette and Tremblay 2003)
France 4 (Catte et al. 2004)
Japan between 12 (Ogawa et al. 1996) and
20 (Girouard and Blöndal 2001)
Netherlands 8 (Catte et al. 2004)
Spain 2 (Catte et al. 2004)
United Kingdom 7 (Catte et al. 2004)
United States between 2 (Girouard and Blöndal 2001) and
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of signiﬁcant asymmetry in response to unanticipated
changes in house prices, but find that the response
of households with negative equity is five times
stronger than the response of those with positive
equity. This ﬁnding likely reﬂects the impact of credit
constraints on these households. The authors there-
fore conclude that an increase in prices that lifts
households out of negative equity induces a dispro-
portionately large consumption response.
Other authors examine the effect of house prices on
consumer spending through the collateral channel.
Most economic models for households that include an
explicit role for collateral or credit-market effects on
consumption do so by adapting for households the
ﬁnancial-accelerator model of Bernanke and Gertler
(1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999),
where endogenous developments in credit markets
modelled as variations in net worth or collateral
amplify and propagate shocks to the macroeconomy.
In the context of housing wealth, ﬂuctuations in house
prices signiﬁcantly alter the value of houses as collat-
eral, influencing the borrowing capacity of credit-
constrained households.  In one of these studies,
Iacoviello and Neri (2008) ﬁnd that housing collateral
effects increase the reduced-form elasticity of aggre-
gate consumption to housing wealth in the United
States by around 2 basis points, from 0.10 to 0.12.15
Results from Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2002)
suggest that, in the United Kingdom, the collateral
channel also increases the sensitivity of consumption
to changes in house prices. Overall, it is likely that the
increased use of houses as collateral has strengthened
the feedback effect of rising house prices on consump-
tion via increased household borrowing (IMF 2008b).
The effect of housing collateral on consumer spending
has often been analyzed by taking into consideration
home-equity borrowing, which is a particular type of
collateralized borrowing.  Home-equity borrowing
occurs when homeowners extract equity from their
homes by increasing their mortgage debt, thus trans-
forming an illiquid asset (housing) into a liquid asset
(cash).16 This transformation of wealth can occur
through the reﬁnancing of property with a larger
15.  This difference is found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
16.  Home-equity borrowing can be divided into “active” and “passive”
types. Active home-equity borrowing is the reduction in home equity on a
current property and is so termed because the homeowner intends to use the
cash generated from the additional debt for consumption or investment pur-
poses or to pay down other debt. Home-equity borrowing resulting from
housing turnover is referred to as passive because relocation provides home-
owners with the opportunity to reduce home equity, which might not have
been their original intention.
mortgage, by obtaining a home equity loan, or through
housing turnover. Housing turnover can result in a
reduction of home equity because consumers might
make a down payment on the new home that is
smaller than the equity accumulated in the old prop-
erty and obtain a new larger mortgage to ﬁnance the
difference.
Whether home-equity borrowing boosts consumption
spending or is used to acquire ﬁnancial assets or to
ﬁnance investment is an important issue, since house
prices are widely considered to be the main determi-
nant of home-equity borrowing. This implies that, as
house prices decelerate among the major advanced
economies, home-equity borrowing will also fall,
potentially depressing consumption expenditures by
more than the amount suggested by the traditional
wealth effect.17 On the other hand, home-equity bor-
rowing can be seen as a new source of ﬁnancing that
merely operationalizes the wealth effect. In this case,
consumers’ use of home-equity borrowing implies
that they were previously constrained in their ability
to consume their wealth or that home-equity borrow-
ing represents a lower-cost means of financing the
consumption of housing wealth. Finally, home-equity
borrowing may also be used by households as a
means to rebalance their portfolios by diversifying
away from housing wealth.
Evidence on the effect of home-
equity borrowing on global
consumption expenditures is mixed.
Empirical evidence on the effect of home-equity bor-
rowing on global consumption expenditures is mixed.
In the United States, although most research ﬁnds that
home-equity borrowing does not play a signiﬁcant
role beyond that of the traditional housing wealth
effect, other analysts find the reverse. Belsky and
Prakken (2004) note, however, that when a signiﬁcant
effect on consumer spending from home-equity bor-
rowing is found in the United States, the coefﬁcients
are very sensitive to the sample period and to the
equation speciﬁcation.  Furthermore, studies citing
17.  Importantly, home-equity borrowing may also provide ﬁnancing for
other types of spending such as spending on home renovations. Therefore,
the studies that examine only the effect of home-equity borrowing on con-
sumer spending would not capture the complete effect on aggregate spending.37 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
survey evidence suggesting that homeowners spend
the funds they receive through home-equity borrow-
ing (e.g., Canner, Dynan, and Passmore 2002) often
ignore whether consumers used the funds to ﬁnance
purchases they otherwise would not have made or to
ﬁnance investment and diversify portfolios.
Not surprisingly, the international evidence suggests
that the effect of home-equity borrowing differs across
countries. In two cross-country OECD studies (Boone,
Girouard, and Wanner 2001; Catte et al. 2004), home-
equity borrowing is found to be strongly associated
with a high estimated marginal propensity to con-
sume from housing wealth. Indeed, Catte et al. (2004)
ﬁnd that 89 per cent of home-equity borrowing is
spent in the United Kingdom, 63 per cent in Canada
and Australia, and 20 per cent in the United States.
For Canada, these results are consistent with evidence
from the Bank of Canada (2007) that suggests that
home-equity borrowing has been an important con-
tributor to growth in consumer spending since 2001.
Catte et al. (2004) conclude that households use the
equity extracted through home-equity borrowing pri-
marily to acquire ﬁnancial assets or to repay other
debts. Spending intentions were focused principally
on home improvements, with less than 20 per cent of
home-equity borrowing generally used to finance
consumption. Hence, although some home-equity
borrowing is consumed, it appears to be used prima-
rily as a tool for acquiring financial assets, repaying
more expensive debts, improving the housing stock,
or ﬁnancing unincorporated businesses.
The Role of Institutional Differences
in Mortgage Markets
The deregulation of housing ﬁnance systems (see Box)
has led to signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the institutional
characteristics of national mortgage markets across
advanced economies that could affect the magnitude
of the observed housing wealth and collateral effects.
Such institutional characteristics include the typical
duration of mortgage contracts, the required levels of
down payment, the existence of equity-release prod-
ucts such as home-equity lines of credit, and the inter-
est rate structure of mortgage contracts (Table 2).
Across countries, there is a high degree of dispersion
in all the indicators considered in Table 2. The ratio of
mortgage debt to gross domestic product (GDP) var-
ies from a low of 32.2 per cent in France and 45.3 per
cent in Canada to a high of 98.4 per cent in the Nether-
lands. Reﬁnancing (fee-free prepayment) is easily
available in some countries, but is either unavailable
or its availability is limited in others, including Can-
ada. Likewise, in some countries (e.g., Canada, the
United States, and the United Kingdom), households
can easily access their housing equity through home-
equity borrowing products, while in others (e.g.,
Japan) these products do not exist or have limited
availability. There is also a large degree of dispersion
across the average term of mortgage loans, which





Signiﬁcant heterogeneity exists in the interest rate
structure of mortgage loans across countries. In the
United Kingdom and Spain, variable or adjustable-
rate mortgages predominate, while in Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and the United States, ﬁxed-
rate mortgages are more popular.18, 19 Finally, the
home ownership rate varies, from 43.2 per cent in
Germany and 68.4 per cent in Canada, to as high as
86.3 per cent in Spain. Despite deregulation, mortgage
markets remain primarily domestic, reflecting
national traditions and cultural factors as well as the
institutional setting of the local banking sector (Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca 2007).
The characteristics of mortgage markets across coun-
tries play an important role in determining the strength
of the link between house prices and consumer spend-
ing. Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2007) ﬁnd that the
correlation between private consumption and house
prices in the main industrialized countries is larger in
those that feature more-developed mortgage markets
with lower down payment ratios, lower rates of
repayment, and a greater share of variable-rate mort-
gages. In a similar vein, the IMF (2008b) has devel-
oped a mortgage market index that measures the
18. Heterogeneity also exists across countries in the tax deductibility of mort-
gage-interest payments; for example, mortgage interest is tax deductible in
the United States, while in Canada it is not.
19. In Canada, the popularity of variable-rate mortgages varies with the slope
of the yield curve.38 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
The recent period of rapid appreciation in global
house prices has occurred alongside substantial inno-
vations in mortgage markets across advanced econo-
mies. Before 1980, mortgage markets were highly
regulated by national authorities and were character-
ized by weak competition among lenders. Mortgage
lending was often largely controlled by specialized
mortgage lenders that received signiﬁcant tax or
funding subsidies. Although regulations differed
across countries, they often included the ﬁxing of
lending and deposit interest rates, limited access to
consumer loans secured on the value of housing col-
lateral, and restrictions on the quantity of mortgage
credit available through ceilings on permissible loan-
to-value ratios and limits on mortgage credit exten-
sion. In light of these regulations, it was difﬁcult
for households to increase consumer spending in
response to increases in their housing wealth, since
their borrowing capacity was often constrained by
credit rationing in the mortgage market (Girouard
and Blöndal 2001).
In Canada, mortgage market deregulation began
somewhat earlier than in other advanced countries
and occurred mainly via the removal, in 1967, of ceil-
ings on lending interest rates and restrictions on the
involvement of commercial banks in housing ﬁnance.
These measures have stood the test of time and have
served Canada well. For example, early liberalization
in Canada has meant better matching of terms of
mortgages and deposits (mostly ﬁve years and less); it
also helped the Canadian mortgage market to avoid
the upheaval when interest rates rose between 1979
and 1981. The legislation also aimed at establishing a
level playing ﬁeld for banks and trust and mortgage
loans companies by allowing banks to enter the mort-
gage lending market.
In the United States, the regulation of mortgage lend-
ing largely occurred through restrictions on the activity
of the savings and loan associations that monopolized
the mortgage market. Before the 1980s, regulation and
tax advantages forced these institutions to concentrate
their lending operations in long-term, ﬁxed-rate mort-
gages, which they funded with short-term deposits
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC). At the same time, the Federal
Reserve’s Regulation Q set strict interest rate ceilings
on their deposits. Savings and loan associations there-
fore faced a sharp outﬂow of low-rate deposits when
money market rates rose above the ceilings set on
deposit interest rates and were forced to restrict
lending activity and reduce credit availability to
households.
Banks in Australia were required to follow guidelines
on the composition of their balance sheets and faced
controls on their deposit and lending rates. In the
United Kingdom, housing ﬁnance was primarily
funded by building societies that charged below-
market rates on mortgage loans and rationed mort-
gage debt, partially as a result of explicit government
requests to limit its growth. Likewise, in France, the
banking system was highly specialized and seg-
mented, limiting the ability of banks and other ﬁnan-
cial institutions to enter the housing ﬁnance market.
As well, access to mortgage credit was restricted by
the use of credit controls and interest rate ceilings.
Over the 1980s, mortgage markets in most advanced
economies were deregulated, increasing competition
among lenders and improving households’ access to
mortgage credit and their ability to borrow against
their housing equity.  Mortgage market deregulation
began in the United States with the gradual phasing
out of Regulation Q between 1980 and 1986. At the
same time, tax advantages for savings and loan asso-
ciations and the development of a secondary mort-
gage market increased competition by encouraging
the entry of a broader range of ﬁnancial institutions.
Mortgage market deregulation also occurred rela-
tively rapidly in the United Kingdom and Australia,
where credit controls were removed in the early
1980s.
In contrast, in some countries, including Germany,
France, and Japan, the reform process was slower and
less extensive. Although interest rate restrictions have
been removed, competition in the mortgage market
remains limited in these countries because public sec-
tor ﬁnancial institutions continue to beneﬁt from sub-
stantial advantages. In Japan, interest rate restrictions
and credit controls were removed very gradually and
were not eliminated completely until the mid-1990s.
Since early 2000, one noticeable innovation in mort-
gage markets has been the rapid growth of subprime
mortgage borrowing. In 2006, the U.S. subprime mort-
gage market accounted for about 14 per cent of the
total mortgage market. Subprime mortgage lending
has also grown rapidly in Canada and the United
Kingdom, although to a much smaller degree than in
the United States. In the United Kingdom, subprime
mortgages represent between 3 and 4 per cent of the
total mortgage market, while in Canada, they account
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for less than 5 per cent of total mortgages outstand-
ing.1 A common feature of subprime mortgage lend-
ers is their reliance on securitization as their primary
source of funding. More recently, subprime lending,
most notably in the United States, has collapsed as
declining house prices led to a sharp increase in
1. Moreover, subprime mortgages in Canada are more conservative than
in either the United Kingdom or the United States, since lenders in Canada
focus more on near-prime and Alt-A customers and offer more conserva-
tive mortgage products (Bank of Canada 2007). Near-prime customers are
borrowers just outside the comfort zone of major ﬁnancial institutions.
Alt-A customers are borrowers with a good credit history but a lack of
income documentation.
default rates on subprime mortgages. These develop-
ments triggered turmoil in ﬁnancial markets as inves-
tors became concerned about which institutions and
investors were exposed to these types of securities. As
a result, U.S. subprime mortgages have declined dra-
matically as a share of total mortgage originations.
Mortgage Market Deregulation (cont’d)
Table 2
Characteristics of Mortgage Markets
Country Ratio of mortgage Home- Loan-to- Home
debt to gross Reﬁnancing equity Average value ratios, ownership Mortgage
domestic product (fee-free borrowing term typical Interest rate rate market
(2006) (%) prepayment) availability (years)  (%) adjustment (%) index
Australia 81.4 Limited Yes 25 80 Mainly V 70.0 0.69
Canada 45.3 No Yes 25a 80–100 FL and FS (77%) 68.4 0.57
V (23%)
France 32.2 No No 15 73.5 FL/FS/Other (86%) 56.5 0.23
V (14%)
Germany 51.3 No No 25 70 Mainly FL and FS 43.2 0.28
Ireland 70.1 No Limited 20 70 V (70%) 74.5 0.39
Rest mostly FS
Japan 36.5 No No 25 80 FL (36%) 60.9 0.39
FS and V (64%)
Netherlands 98.4 Yes Yes 30 90 FL (74%) 54.2 0.71
FS (19%)
V (7%)
Spain 58.6 No Limited 20 70 V (75%) 86.3 0.40
Rest mainly FS
United Kingdom 83.1 Limited Yes 25 75 FS (28%) 70.0 0.58
V (72%)
United States 76.3 Yes Yes 30 80 FL (85%) 67.8 0.98
FS (15%)
a. Recently, however, longer amortization periods (for up to 40 years) have proven successful. These extended amortization periods are available for insured
mortgages. Beginning in October 2008, the maximum amortization period on insured mortgages will be 35 years.
Source: Column (2) and part of column (8) are from the European Mortgage Federation (2006) supplemented with data from Statistics Canada, the U.S. Census
Bureau, and the Japanese Statistics Bureau. Columns (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), and part of column (8) are from IMF (2008b), and column (7) is from Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca (2007). In column (7), mortgages are classiﬁed according to the rate structure, where FL = ﬁxed-rate mortgage, in which interest
rate are ﬁxed for more than ﬁve years or until expiry; FS = mixed mortgages, in which interest rates are ﬁxed for one to ﬁve years; and V = variable mort-
gages, in which interest rates are renegotiated after one year or are tied to market rates, or are adjustable at the lender’s discretion.40 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
degree of mortgage market development in a given
country.20 The IMF (2008b) ﬁnds that mortgage mar-
kets in the United States and Australia are the most
flexible and complete. Canada and the United Kingdom
also have well-developed mortgage markets; Can-
ada’s solid mortgage market has a variety of terms
(mostly ﬁve years or less) and conservative lending
practices that have stood the test of time. The mort-
gage market in the United States generally consists of
ﬁxed-rate loans with long maturity and prepayment
options. These characteristics may lead households to
underestimate the long-term risks, resulting in over-
borrowing. Access to ﬁnancing is more limited in
France and Germany. Moreover, the MPC out of hous-
ing wealth is generally found to be higher for coun-
tries with more-developed mortgage markets, as
measured by higher values of the mortgage market
index; Japan, however, is a notable outlier (Chart 6).
The MPC out of housing wealth
is generally found to be higher
for countries with more-
developed mortgage markets.
Although the level of development in a country’s
mortgage market is a signiﬁcant determinant of the
strength of the housing wealth effect, it is also impor-
tant to consider the role played by institutional differ-
ences across national mortgage markets. As mentioned
previously, home-equity borrowing is used more
extensively in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Australia, but its availability is limited in Germany
(see Table 2). This country split coincides with that
between countries with market and bank-based ﬁnan-
cial systems and may suggest that the availability of
home-equity borrowing products depends, in part, on
lenders’ ability to raise loanable funds and transfer
risk through capital markets. Furthermore, this may
be related to the fact that mortgage market liberaliza-
tion and deregulation generally took place earlier and
20.  The index is constructed as a simple average of the availability of home-
equity borrowing, reﬁnancing, the typical loan-to-value ratio, the average
term of a mortgage contract, covered bond issuance as a per cent of residen-
tial loans outstanding, and mortgage-backed securities as a per cent of resi-
dential loans outstanding. The index lies between 0 and 1, with higher values
indicating easier household access to mortgage credit.
was more extensive in market-based ﬁnancial sys-
tems. Consequently, the MPC out of housing wealth
tends to be higher in countries with access to home-
equity borrowing, again with the exception of Japan
(see Table 2).
The collateral effect on consumer spending is likely to
be the largest in countries with a high loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, such as the United States, which also have
more-developed subprime mortgage markets. As sug-
gested by Iacoviello and Neri (2008), a higher LTV
ratio increases the maximum borrowing capacity of
households (measured by the expected present value
of their home multiplied by the LTV ratio). At the
same time, a higher LTV ratio has been found to
decrease the share of credit-constrained consumers in
an economy (Japelli and Pagano 1989). Therefore, the
larger the LTV ratio, the higher the liquidity of hous-
ing wealth and the larger the effect of housing collat-
eral on consumption (Chart 7).
The wealth effect on consumer spending may also be
largerincountrieswithahigherrateofhomeownership,
since owner-occupiers and renters may react differ-
ently to an increase in house prices. A rise in house
prices increases the wealth of homeowners and can
induce a positive effect on consumer spending. For
renters, however, a rise in house prices raises expected
future rents and the down payment requirement for
Chart 6
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those saving to purchase a house, which may cause
them to reduce their spending.
Other institutional features of mortgage markets,
including the degree of securitization, the magnitude
of transactions costs, and the use of credit-scoring
techniques, also affect the magnitude of the collateral
and housing wealth effects on consumer spending.
First, the ability of lenders to securitize mortgages and
other consumer loans can reduce the cost of mort-
gages and increase the availability of mortgage credit
by providing lenders with access to a wider range of
investor capital and increasing their ability to manage
their capital (Klyuev and Mills 2006). As well,
advances in credit-scoring techniques reduce the
problem of asymmetric information and have improved
borrowers’ access to credit. Such developments are
prevalent in the United States, where a large share of
mortgages is securitized. Recent events there suggest,
however, that securitization can come at the cost of
reducing the lender’s incentive to practise prudent
lending standards, since the originator of mortgages
does not hold the securities on its balance sheet. Trans-
actions costs are another important factor governing
consumers’ ability to spend their housing wealth.
When it is costly to withdraw housing equity, more
homeowners are likely to face credit constraints.
To summarize, in countries with a high degree of
securitization, lower transactions costs, and better
Loan-to-value ratio
*





























credit-scoring techniques, such as the United States
and the United Kingdom, the collateral and housing
wealth effects are likely to be larger.
Overall, based on their mortgage market characteris-
tics, the countries considered can be split into two
groups. Countries in group one, including the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, have more-
developed mortgage markets and tend to have higher
ratios of mortgage debt to GDP, higher LTV ratios, and
access to home-equity products. Countries in group
two, including Germany and Italy, have less-devel-
oped mortgage markets. The effect of housing wealth
on consumer spending is generally estimated to be
larger in the group of countries with more-developed
mortgage markets.  Japan is a notable exception, with
a relatively high MPC and a relatively less-developed
mortgage market.
Has the Link between House Prices
and Consumer Spending Changed?
The link between housing wealth and consumer
spending has evolved in parallel with the deregula-
tion of mortgage markets (see Box), which has been
achieved through changes in prudential and wider
capital market regulations, improvements in technol-
ogy and reductions in its cost, developments in the
sharing of information on credit histories, and the
deepening of markets for securitized contracts and
derivatives (Muellbauer 2007). As a result, households
have gained greater access to unsecured and secured
credit, reducing the number of credit-constrained
consumers (Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel 2006;
Iacoviello and Neri 2008). These developments have
also signiﬁcantly reduced the costs associated with
accessing home equity (Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani
2001). Furthermore, household debt levels have
increased as households have taken advantage of their
greater ability to borrow against their home equity,
resulting in a stronger link between house prices and
consumer spending.
Mortgagemarketderegulationmayhavealsoincreased
the responsiveness of consumption to a given change
in house prices by increasing the average LTV ratio
across countries. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), for
example, argue that by reducing the equity require-
ments associated with collateralized borrowing, the
recent changes in housing ﬁnance systems may have
enhanced the ability of households to borrow as well
as strengthening the collateral effect on consumer42 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
spending. In addition, as LTV ratios have increased, it
is likely that younger households saving to buy their
ﬁrst home have reacted by lowering their savings as
the amount needed for their initial down payment has
declined. It is possible that this has reduced the nega-
tive impact of house prices on the consumption of this
demographic group (Muellbauer 2007).
The link between housing wealth
and consumer spending has
evolved in parallel with the
deregulation of mortgage markets.
The empirical evidence across countries conﬁrms that
ﬁnancial deregulation has likely strengthened the
wealth effect of rising house prices on consumption.21
For the United States and the United Kingdom, Boone,
Girouard, and Wanner (2001) ﬁnd that, beginning in
the 1980s, ﬁnancial deregulation strengthened the
effect of house prices on consumer spending. In conti-
nental Europe, where ﬁnancial reforms were imple-
mented later, they find that the same effects did not
begin until the early 1990s. This is consistent with evi-
dence from Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005), who ﬁnd
that the effect of housing wealth on consumption in
the United States has increased with the greater avail-
ability of home-equity loans. Overall, evidence from
Bayoumi and Edison (2003), who examine a panel of
16 advanced countries, suggests that the size of the
housing wealth effect has risen as financial deregula-
tion has taken place, from an MPC of 4 cents per dollar
between 1970 and 2000 to an MPC of 7 cents per dollar
between 1984 and 2000.
21. Although not examined in this article, it is also likely that ﬁnancial dereg-
ulation has had a direct effect on house prices, contributing to the recent
global increases.
Conclusion
Over the past 10 years, many advanced economies
have experienced a tremendous increase in house
prices and, not surprisingly, a concomitant increase in
consumption expenditures. While some of this
increase is likely related to fundamentals, including
low borrowing rates, increased incomes, and ﬁnancial
innovation, at times the increases have been outside of
the range suggested by these fundamentals. The recent
decline in house prices in some major economies,
most notably in the United States, has raised concerns
about potential spillover effects on consumption and
growth. From reviewing a broad spectrum of litera-
ture, we ﬁnd that house prices play an important role
in household spending decisions for several countries.
This link is stronger in countries like Australia, Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom, which
have more-developed mortgage markets, than it is
in countries like Spain and France, which have less-
developed mortgage markets. These results suggest
that, in the event of a major global correction in house
prices, the link between house prices and consumer
spending can pose serious challenges for policy-makers.
In particular, rapid decreases in the price of housing
can have serious implications for aggregate output
and should help to contain inﬂation, particularly if a
house price correction is followed by a signiﬁcant
downturn in consumption expenditures. Further-
more, the negative consequences associated with a
general decline in global house prices would be
expected to be greatest for those countries where
house prices are seriously overvalued and where con-
sumption expenditures and house prices are closely
linked (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Australia).43 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 2008
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